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 This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – 
words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. Building 
on the education of attention model of learning, utterances of concrete words are 
defined as attentional actions: a repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to 
indicate (i.e. point out) a particular aspect of the current situation to someone in order to 
achieve something. Based on recent empirical evidence on categorical colour perception, 
attentional actions are proposed to constrain the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation of 
persons into task-specific devices. The paper ends by situating the proposed account 
in a wider theoretical perspective on language. This paper serves two purposes: first, it 
undermines the scope objection against the ecological-enactive approach, and second, 
it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical evidence with respect to the role 
of language in categorical colour perception.
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ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS – AN ECOLOGICAL-ENACTIVE ACCOUNT 
OF UTTERANCES OF CONCRETE WORDS
The cognitive sciences are currently making a pragmatic turn (Engel et al., 
2013). The dominant representational theory of cognition, where cognition is 
conceived of as computation over mental representations, is gradually giving 
way to the ecological-enactive approach, which foregrounds the action-oriented, 
embodied, and situated nature of cognition (see §1.3 for a short introduction). 
This pragmatic turn has implications for understanding linguistic behaviour. In 
this paper, I reconceive the cognitive function of utterances of  concrete words, 
words that concern observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. 
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There are two reasons for starting with concrete words. First, concrete words 
are a paradigmatic example in the dominant code-view in the representational 
theory of cognition, according to which words function as codes for mental 
representations (see §1.1). Second, the empirical research on the relation 
between language and cognition on which this paper draws often relies on these 
concrete words, in particular colour words (see §2).
In this paper, I propose a way to understand utterances of concrete words 
from the ecological-enactive approach by starting from the constraint view. 
On this view, language is reconceptualised as a mode of action that functions 
as enabling constraints on cognitive and interactive dynamics. Building on 
the ecological-enactive conception of attention, I define an attentional action as 
a repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate a particular 
aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. I 
argue that a concrete word, whether performed as a single-word utterance or in 
the context of a grammatically structured utterance, has to be understood 
in terms of its constraining effect on ecological-enactive attention. In other 
words, utterances of concrete words are attentional actions.
This paper serves two purposes: first, it undermines the familiar scope 
objection against the ecological-enactive approach, according to which it can 
only explain basic cognition and cannot explain ‘higher’ cognition such as 
linguistic cognition. Second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical 
evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception.
This paper is structured as follows: first, I introduce the code view and 
the ecological-enactive approach. I propose an account of a child’s first 
utterances of concrete words as attentional actions based on the constraint view 
of language and a discussion of learning language in line with the education 
of attention model of learning (§1). Then I discuss some recent empirical 
findings that show verbal colour categories to have an effect on putatively 
non-linguistic colour perception (§2). In line with this evidence, I propose 
an account of the cognitive effects of attentional actions in terms of constraints 
on the phenotypic reorganisation of task-specific devices (§3). In the final 
section, I situate the account of attentional actions in a larger theoretical 
perspective on language by means of remarks on the context-dependency and 
reflexivity of language, grammatical structure, and written language (§4).
1. Words: from codes to constraints
1.1. The code view
Entrenched in our thinking is a picture of language as a carrier of thought. 
We find articulations of this picture in everyday English expressions such as 
putting a concept into words, or a text containing new ideas.1 In theoretical 
reflections on language, this picture manifests in the idea that words encode 
1 Reddy (1993) lists a great number of examples from everyday English.
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mental meanings. This has been dubbed the code view (Harris, 1990; Linell, 
2005; Love, 2004; Kravchenko, 2007). On this view, communication consists 
in the encoding of mental meanings in public symbols and the subsequent 
decoding of these public symbols back into mental meanings. 
The code view lies at the root of many theories of language. Notable 
historical proponents of the code view include Aristotle (1975, p. 43), who 
claimed ‘spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul’, and John 
Locke (1690/2004, p. 363), who took words to be ‘sensible marks of ideas’. 
De Saussure (1922/2011, p. 66) defined the linguistic sign as a connection 
between a concept and a representation of a linguistic sound. He described 
linguistic communication in terms of the speaking circuit: a concept ‘unlocks’ 
a sound representation, which is transmitted to the organs used in producing 
speech, where they are transfused into actual sound patterns which then 
travel to another person in order to undergo the reverse operation (Ibid., 
pp. 11–12). The second half of the 20th century witnessed the rise of the 
representational theory of cognition, which enabled the formulation of new 
versions of the code view. According to one version of this theory, thought 
itself is language-like, and understanding public language is essentially 
a code-like translation to a language of thought, called mentalese (Devitt, 
2006; Fodor, 1975, 2007; Pinker, 1994, 2007). Other versions of the 
representational theory of cognition rely instead on the broader notion of 
semantic or conceptual representations. For example, Cairns and Cairns (1976, 
pp. 17–18) claim that ‘The listener, B, must decode A's message by converting 
the sounds into a semantic representation’. Nowadays, the idea that words encode 
semantic representations is a staple in linguistics textbooks. In The Blackwell 
Handbook of Linguistics, for example, Cruse (2017, p. 253) states:
Each of us has in our cognitive system some kind of inventory of all 
the words that we know, together with all the information – semantic, 
grammatical, and phonetic / graphic – necessary for their correct use. 
[…] The inventory is accessed via written or spoken forms every time 
we hear or read something in a language we know, and via some kind of 
semantic representation every time we produce language.
In The Lexicon: An Introduction, part of the Oxford Textbooks in 
Linguistics series, Ježek (2016, p. 5) claims that the ‘existence of a word’ is 
the result of ‘the direct association of a concept with a lexical form’.
Proponents of the code view thus differ in what they take words to be 
encoding: concepts, ideas, semantic representations, etc. For the purposes of 
this paper I shall use mental representation as an umbrella term to denote this 
panoply of mental meanings. The code view can then be defined as follows: 
A word is a code for (a set of) mental representations. Note that due to 
synonymy and polysemy, the mapping between words and (sets of) mental 
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representations cannot be a one-to-one mapping, but instead is a many-to-many 
mapping (Cruse, 2017, p. 252).
I introduce the code view in order to use it as a foil. The reason for this use 
is that the code view has had a deep influence on Western theoretical reflections 
on language and remains the dominant view, although there are of course 
alternative views.2 The purpose of this paper is neither to determine how 
wide-spread the code view is, nor to provide arguments to criticise it, but 
instead to use it as a contrast. This enables bringing out the defining features 
of the constraint view to which this paper aims to contribute.
1.2. Mental representations: can’t have, don’t need
Proponents of the pragmatic turn in the cognitive sciences claim that 
cognition is embodied. Yet, there is substantial disagreement about what this 
claim means (Anderson, 2003; Kiverstein & Clark, 2009;  Wilson, 2002; Wilson 
& Golonka, 2013). In its weakest interpretation, an ‘embodied concept is 
a neural structure that is part of, or makes use of the sensorimotor system 
of our brains’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 104). As opposed to classical 
cognitivism, mental representations are no longer amodal. But cognition is still 
a computational process over discrete mental representations on this weak 
interpretation. The strongest interpretation, known as radical embodied 
cognition, aims to provide a thoroughly non-representational approach.3 Note 
that a non-representational approach forswears mental representations. This 
does not entail forswearing public representations such as maps, assertions, 
diagrams, charts, or flatpack furniture assembly instructions. 
The account in this paper is based primarily on two research programmes 
that espouse a form of radical embodied cognition: ecological psychology 
(Chemero, 2009; Gibson, 1979; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Turvey, Shaw, 
Reed, & Mace, 1981) and enactivism (Hurley, 1998; Hutto & Myin, 
2013; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Stewart, 2010; Noë, 2012; Varela, Thompson, 
& Rosch, 1991). I therefore speak of the ecological-enactive approach. Note 
that both enactivism and ecological psychology are research programmes 
within which different theories are espoused, of which I will not provide 
an exhaustive taxonomy here.
2 Examples of alternatives include Ryle, who does not believe that there are mental meanings (Tanney, 2015), 
the later Wittgenstein (1953/2009), Voloshinov’s (1930/1973) Marxist philosophy of language, Maturana’s 
(1978) biological approach to language, Bakhtin’s (1982) dialogism, integrational linguistics (Davis & Taylor, 
1990; Davis & Taylor, 2003) and the distributed language perspective (Cowley, 2011a).
3 Named as such by Clark (1997, p. 148), who defines it as follows: ‘Structured, symbolic, representational, 
and computational views of cognition are mistaken. Embodied cognition is best studied by means of noncom-
putational and nonrepresentational ideas and explanatory schemes.’ Proponents that fly under the banner of 
radical embodied cognition include Chemero (2009) and Hutto and Myin (2013; 2017). The word radical here 
should not be understood as a radicalisation of embodied cognitive science, but instead in the sense of having 
different roots. These theoretical roots include American pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey, and Rorty), beha-
viourism (Ryle and Skinner), ecological psychology (James and Eleanor Gibson), theoretical biology (Matura-
na and Varela), dynamic systems theory (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van Gelder, 1998) biophilosophy (Jonas), and 
existential phenomenology (Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty).
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A proponent of the ecological-enactive approach to cognition can employ 
two lines of argument with respect to the representational theory of cognition: 
can’t-have and don’t-need arguments (Hutto & Myin, 2013). Can’t-have 
arguments are negative. They aim to show that there are currently no 
naturalistically credible theoretical resources available for accounting for 
mental representations. Hutto and Myin (2013), for instance, argue that there 
is no satisfactory account of how mental representations get their 
representational contents. If a can’t have argument is successful, 
representational approaches to cognition are off the table. However, as 
Chemero (2013, p. 3) points out, can’t have arguments are likely to be met with 
a ‘collective shrug’. That is, these arguments against the representational theory 
of cognition tend not to convince proponents of that theory. Don’t-need 
arguments, on the other hand, are positive. They aim to show that mental 
representations need not be invoked in order to explain a particular cognitive 
phenomenon. If a don’t need argument is successful, this does not imply 
that the non-representational explanation should automatically be preferred 
over an alternative representational explanation. However, meta-theoretical 
considerations – such as ontological parsimony and explanatory power – can 
then be used to mount arguments in favour of either explanation.
Note that the two strategies can be employed independently. It is possible 
to argue that we can’t have mental representations without supplying 
a non-representational alternative explanation, and it is possible to propose 
a non-representational explanation without arguing that that we can’t have 
mental representations. The intended contribution of this paper is only to 
provide a don’t need argument. This is done by showing a possible account 
of utterances of concrete words that does not invoke mental representations, 
and show how it can account for recent empirical evidence. 
1.3. The ecological-enactive approach in a nutshell
The guiding idea of the enactive approach is that perception and action 
are intimately intertwined. In the dynamic coupling between organism 
and environment, a feedback loop is set up (see Figure 1). This is called 
a sensorimotor loop (Stewart, 2010). Cognition is defined as perceptually guided 
action (Varela et al., 1991, p. 173), and thus becomes something the organism 
does in interaction with its environment (Myin, 2016; Noë, 2012). Cognitive 
processes do not take place inside the head of the organism, but are relational 
in nature.
Ecological psychologists similarly stress the intertwining of perception 
and action in the concept of affordance (Gibson, 1977). Organisms perceive 
what the environment affords doing, that is, possibilities for action. For 
example, a flight of stairs is perceived as climbable and a cup is perceived 
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as graspable.4 The perceived affordances depend inter alia on aspects of 
the environment, the skills of the organism (not everything that is liftable for 
a world champion weightlifter is liftable for me), as well as the material 
possibility we have in exercising these skills, for instance the availability 
of artefacts. As Stewart (2010, p. 29) remarks, ‘a snow-covered mountain 
becomes an entirely different place if you have skis on your feet (and if you 
know how to ski!)’. 
We never perceive only one affordance. An individual always perceives 
a field of affordances, that consists of a myriad of possibilities for action 
afforded by the environment (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). Not all of these 
affordances will invite behaviour equally. Which affordances are more inviting 
will depend on a host of factors. Whether something is perceived as liftable 
will for example depend on social setting (a statue in a museum does not 
afford lifting) and the degree to which a person feels fatigued. Even things such 
as mental health, for example, have an important role to play: for a depressed 
person, much less of the environment will be perceived as liftable (De Haan, 
Rietveld, Stokhof, & Denys, 2013). 
1.4. Ecological-enactive learning as the education of attention 
On the ecological-enactive approach, the goal of cognitive processes is 
not truthful or accurate representation, but perceptually guided action. 
The notion of representation is replaced with attunement (Gibson, 1966). How 
does a child attune to its environment? The ecological answer is through 
the education of attention (Adolph & Kretch, 2015; Gibson, 1953; Gibson, 
1963; Gibson, 1966). Attention is understood as selective openness5 to 
the field of affordances in relation to a task or goal (Gibson & Rader, 
1979; Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). Attention can only be evaluated with 
respect to a particular task or goal. In line with the definition of cognition as 
4 A good example of this is the explanation Zhu & Bingham (2010) give for the the size-weight illusion. This 
illusion consists in the fact that a smaller object that has the same mass as a larger one is incorrectly judged to 
be heavier. However, the illusion disappears if we take people to perceive the ‘throw-ability’ of the objects. A 
larger object has to have a greater mass to be just as suitable to throwing as a smaller object. Zhu and Bingham 
found that the larger object is indeed perceived to be just as heavy as the smaller object when it is equally 
‘throw-able’.
5 See Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) for an ecological-enactive account of the neural dynamics underlying 
this selective openness.
Figure 1.The sensorimotor loop: a feedback loop consisting of sensory (S) and motor (M) processes (based on 
Stewart (2010, Figure 1.1)).
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perceptually guided action, goal-directed behaviour is enabled by a person’s 
sensorimotor skills for acting on relevant affordances. The education of 
attention thus consists in the development of skills that allow for the context-
dependent perceptual guidance of goal-directed behaviour. In other words, 
as a person is attuned to her environment, she thereby learns how to act on 
those affordances that are relevant.
In the case of humans, the education of attention mostly takes place in 
social interaction through processes of guided rediscovery (Ingold, 2001; 
Zukow-Goldring & Ferko, 1994). This means that a master of a practice 
shows or makes present affordances to a beginner in such a way that the 
beginner can learn a particular skill or activity. Note that this process need 
not be explicitly didactic, but can simply consist in doing something together 
(Reed, 1995). In child development, the education of attention highlights 
the active role of both caregiver and child. The caregiver is responsible for 
setting up the physical conditions that allow the child to learn.6 Crucial here 
is the Vygotskian idea of the zone of proximal development, which comprises 
activities that the child can engage in only with the help of the caregiver 
(Reed, 1995). Besides physical structuring, the education of attention also 
relies on normative and cognitive structuring of the situation by the caregiver 
(Williams, 2010). That is, the caregiver’s competence in her community’s 
practices allow her to determine what the child is, could, or should be doing, 
and encourage and discourage the child’s behaviour on this basis.7 
These conditions also hold for the development of more intellectual 
skills. In learning to talk, a child’s utterances do not start out as complete 
speech acts. Instead, the caregiver treats the child as if she is already 
competent and on this basis encourages and discourages the child’s 
behaviour.8 For example, a child uttering something vaguely like /ˈteɪbəl/ in 
the presence of a table can be encouraged by a caregiver by saying Very 
good! That is indeed a table!, even though nothing in the behaviour of 
the child shows that she intended to say of is thing that it is a table. Treating 
the child as if she is making an assertion is crucial here. If we were to take 
 
6 For example, Zukow-Goldring and Ferko (1994, p. 172–173) describe a caregiver teaching a child how to 
roll a ball. The caregiver sits the child down with legs apart, a posture that provides a guide for the trajectory of 
the ball whilst at the same time allowing the child freedom of movement from a stable position. The caregiver 
then begins the activity by gathering attention through verbal means (Look!), accompanied by moving the ball 
in the child’s line of sight. After the child’s attention has been attracted, the caregiver rolls the ball over to the 
child, and helps the child to roll the ball back, for instance by placing the infants hands on the ball and guiding 
the return. In this way, the child can gradually learn the activity of rolling a ball.
7 For example, Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomi, and Rohlfing (2013) describe how a six-month infant that is being 
changed accidentally touches a diaper. The mother responds to this contingency by placing the diaper in the 
child’s hand while saying ‘yes you can start by holding the diaper’. In this way, the infant’s essentially random 
arm movement is incorporated in the goal directed activity.
8 Goldstein, King & West (2003) show that 8 month old children are already highly sensitive to positive 
responses to their vocalisations, a sensitivity that goes beyond mere imitation.
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the child to be engaged in mere meaningless babbling, there would be no point at 
all in encouraging or discouraging her behaviour.
In line with the intimate intertwining of perception and action, 
successfully participating in her community’s practices requires the child to 
see her world in the correct way (Gallagher, 2005). She has to be able to 
pick up on those affordances that are salient with regard to the practices of 
her community. Through the education of attention, the teacher gradually 
introduces the child in the practices of her community. Educated attention 
is manifest in altered selective openness: a person is now able to pick up on 
and skilfully act on affordances of her environment that earlier did not show 
up for her.
1.5. What a child learns as she learns to speak
On the code view, language learning consists in forming the correct 
associations between words and mental representations.9 Ryle (1945a) made 
a distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, roughly the distinction 
between knowing a proposition and having a skill. The code-view assumes 
linguistic knowledge to be a species of knowing-that: knowing a word is 
knowing that it stands for (a set of) mental representations. This does not entail 
that the code view implies that learning language can have no effect on how 
the world is represented. It does entail that the child has to mentally represent 
the world before she learns language. On an ecological-enactive approach, this 
need not be the case. Emphasising the normative structure of the education 
of attention means that we do not have to assume that the child can already 
perceive in a categorical way. Instead, by means of the education of attention, 
the child learns how to ‘use words’ and thereby learns to perceive categorically. 
In keeping with the relational perspective of the ecological-enactive approach, 
categorical perception does not rely on mentally representing categories, 
but consists instead in having the skills for making distinctions between things 
in the world in line with a community’s standards.
This is in line with the observation that a child learns to communicate in 
‘the midst of “doing”’ (Bruner, 1990, p. 70). A child is not a passive observer, 
but participates in activities and it is in these activities that she starts ‘doing 
things with words’ (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2009, p. 170). Viewed from this 
perspective, the language learner does not acquire knowledge-that about 
language (Taylor, 2013, p. 317). She does not need to learn that a particular 
words stands for particular things in the world. Instead she comes to know-how 
to do things by talking (Van den Herik, 2017). The question of the acquisition 
of a language is substituted for asking ‘how the child comes to enter 
9 Papafragou (2005, p. 357), for example, states that ‘the main task of the [language] learner is to figure out 
which aspects of the input language correspond to which nonlinguistic conceptual primitive notions – or com-
binations thereof’. Another example, that shows clearly the idea that meanings come before words, is given by 
Clark (2009, p. 8): ‘One issue for language acquisition is how children find out which meanings there are words 
for; another is just how they map each meaning to the right word.’
98ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
the linguistic community’ (Reed, 1995, p. 2) which she does by learning 
a repertoire of social skills (Reed, 1996; Verbrugge, 1985).
This reconceptualisation of language learning has two important 
implications. First, it shows that linguistic behaviour is always time-bound 
and context-bound (Love 1990). According to what Harris (1998, p. 81) calls 
the principle of co-temporality, what is being said is immediately relevant to 
the current context, and makes sense or fails to make sense within that 
particular context. In other words, successful linguistic communication consists 
in the ability of two speakers to converge on a shared understanding (Cuffari, 
Di Paolo, De Jaegher, 2015; Davidson, 1986), an achievement that relies 
on bringing all kinds of knowledge to bear (Van den Herik, 2017). Second, 
language ‘must be based on social coordination’ (Cowley, 2011b, p. 11). This 
is evident in ontogenetic development of linguistic abilities: children learn 
language in a triadic relation, with a caregiver jointly attending to things, in 
which the focus is on what one can do with language. Language is therefore 
essentially dialogical (Cowley, 2011a). For example, prior to learning its 
first words, infants already participate in interactions that involve turn-taking 
behaviours under the guidance of a caregiver (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2016).
1.6. Utterances of concrete words as attentional actions
To recapitulate, according to the ecological-enactive approach, cognition 
is a loopy, dynamic, and relational affair. Through the education of attention 
the developing child gradually attunes to her environment, a process that 
relies constitutively on both physical and normative structuring of the 
learning situation by a caregiver that is already competent in the community’s 
practices. However, this leaves open the question what we do with words.
The fact that the ecological-enactive approach eschews mental 
representations means that the code-view will not do. I start from a different 
picture of language: the constraint view (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2011, 2016; 
Rączaszek-Leonardi & Kelso, 2008; Verbrugge, 1985). On the constraint 
view, language is viewed as a system of social actions that function by 
constraining unfolding cognitive and interactive dynamics. Because of this 
reliance on unfolding dynamics, linguistic actions neither have to stand for 
the processes they constrain, nor do they have to map like a code to the 
results of their constraining action. In line with the action-oriented nature of 
cognition, language is reconceptualised as a mode of action. Conceiving of 
language in terms of constraints brings together the two implications just 
discussed: ongoing processes are constrained by utterances in real time 
(language is time-bound and context-bound), and constraints presuppose 
a communication situation on which the constraining action can take place 
(the social and dialogical nature of language).
The education of attention model of learning can explain how language 
gets to have these constraining effects. Language can fulfil the constraining 
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role because it consists of recognisable and repeatable forms of behaviour, 
which I refer to as repeatables (Van den Herik, 2017). Within the education 
of attention, the repeatables we construe as words ‘anchor’ attention10: by 
being easily recognisable, they provide a fixed point that allows for 
the stabilisation, or sedimentation, of the education of attention.
Different kinds of linguistic actions have different kinds of constraining 
effect. For the purposes of this paper, I further look into the constraining 
effects of concrete words from the perspective of ontogenetic development. 
I start from concrete words because they are a paradigmatic example for 
proponents of the code-view, and empirical research on the relation between 
language and cognition, which I will consider in the next section, usually 
involves only concrete words.
The ecological-enactive alternative I propose, however, does not start 
from ‘concrete words’ in the sense that code views do. It starts from linguistic 
actions, or utterances. From the perspective of the child there are no words, 
there are only repeatables: forms of behaviour that can be recognised from 
one instance to another, and that can be reenacted. In linguistic behaviour, 
concrete words usually do not occur in isolation, but rather in the context of 
a grammatically structured utterance. Notable exceptions are the naming 
games caregivers play with children, where they point to an object and utter 
the word for that object, and the child’s first utterances. A child’s production 
of language starts out with single-word utterances before she starts combining 
words into structured sequences (Clark, 2009, p. 115; Fenson et al., 1994). 
For the purposes of this paper I start by looking at a child’s single word 
utterances of concrete words. The hypothesis I propose is that a child’s 
first utterances of concrete words are attentional actions. An attentional 
action is defined as a repeatable performed by a person to indicate a particular 
aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. 
In this paper, I only claim that we can understand a particular kind of 
linguistic utterance, namely those featuring concrete words, as attentional 
actions. I do not mean to say that only those utterances are attentional 
actions, or even that only utterances can be explained as attentional actions. 
It seems defendable to say, for example, that ostensive gestures are also 
attentional actions. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will not pursue 
the question how generalisable the account of attentional actions is.
Let us unpack this definition. It builds on the notion of indication 
developed by Reed (1995). The child’s utterance is not a label, or a name, but 
a skilful way of directing ecological attention. In other words, we can 
understand an attentional action as a constraint on attention. While Reed limits 
the indicational phase to roughly the second year of a child’s development, 
I argue that this account of concrete words as attentional actions can be 
10 I take this image picture of words anchoring attention from Clark’s (1996) reference to Jackendoff (1996). 
Given the ecological definition of attention in play in this paper I put it to different use.
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generalised to adults’ grammatically structured utterances. I return to this issue 
in §4.2. In first instance, indication is a second-personal skill. We direct 
somebody else’s attention, and whether the attentional action will succeed 
depends as much on the person that performs it as the person to which it is 
addressed. Derived from the primordial second-personal action, the person 
that produces the attentional action can coincide with the addressee, as when 
we talk to ourselves to direct our own attention. 
Note that the definition states that only aspects of the current situation 
can be indicated. Crucially, the current situation is not limited to what is 
currently perceivable. A toy that is put away in the closet can be indicated in 
the same way as a toy that is in view. For the ecological-enactive 
approach ‘there is no sharp line to be drawn between that which is and 
that which is not perceptually present’ (Noë, 2012, pp. 25–29). In general, 
non-representational approaches such as the ecological-enactive approach 
often face the objection that they cannot deal with ‘representation-hungry’ 
phenomena, such as cognition involving absentia or abstracta (Clark and 
Toribio, 1994). See Kiverstein and Rietveld (2018) and Degenaar and Myin 
(2014) for ecological-enactive solutions to this objection. It is outside the 
scope of this paper to go into these solutions. For now it is important to see that 
whereas a code-view conceives of language learning in terms of learning 
the meaning of a decontextualised word, from an ecological-enactive 
perspective the situated nature of linguistic actions is foregrounded.
There are four elements involved in an attentional action: the person 
that performs the action, the person that is addressed, the indicated aspect of 
the situation, and the goal of the attentional action. Attentional actions can 
be metaphorically ‘anchored’ to certain aspects of the situation in the unfolding 
of the education of the attention. In §3 I look at the cognitive mechanism that 
enable this ‘anchoring’ in more detail. For now, it is important to note that 
attention is understood in ecological terms, that is, as the selective openness 
to the field of affordances in relation to a task or goal. To direct attention 
by means of an attentional action is thus to foreground an affordance of 
the current situation, some possibility for action. By thus promoting 
the salience of certain affordances present in the current situation, the chance 
that they will be acted upon in the unfolding of the situation is increased. 
These skills, required for constraining attention and having one’s attention 
constrained, are brought to fruition in the education of attention, which occurs 
in the context of caregiver and child doing something together. 
Realising that attentional actions stem from, and are performed as part 
of recurrent and structured social situations is crucial for dealing with 
Quine’s question (Reed, 1995): how does a child learn to refer to the same 
things that their caregivers refer to? Quine (1960) identified the fundamental 
problem of the indeterminacy of reference. This indeterminacy of reference 
spells problems for a code-view account of language learning. The argument 
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is as follows. The code view assumes that a child has to learn what words 
refer to, which is accomplished by associating the word with the correct 
mental representation. Adults teach a child a word by pointing out an object 
and saying the word. This ostensive gesture, however, is not enough 
to specify what is referred to. The reason for this is that pointing out 
a dog is indistinguishable from pointing out  this particular dog, or 
a standing-rather-than-a-sitting dog, or all and sundry undetached parts of 
a dog, or any other fanciful fictions. There is thus a referential ambiguity 
inherent in ostensive gestures. This means that the child has insufficient 
evidence for determining what the referent of the ostensive gesture is, and 
therefore cannot decide on the basis of the ostensive gesture alone what 
mental representation needs to be associated with the word ‘dog’.
In order to be able to answer Quine’s question, code-view theorists 
usually assume that there are a priori constraints on the hypotheses that children 
entertain with respect to word-meanings (Clark, 2009, p. 124). For example, 
children are thought to assume that words refer to a whole objects (the whole-
object assumption) and taxonomic kinds, rather than thematically related 
objects (the taxonomic assumption; Clark, 1981, p. 40; Markman, 1981). By 
means of these a priori constraints, the referential ambiguity is dissolved and 
a child is able to arrive at the correct hypothesis, for example that ‘dog’ refers 
to dogs.
If we, however, assume that utterances of concrete words are attentional 
actions, Quine’s question can be evaded. To understand why this is the case, 
we have to realise that the environment of the child is highly structured, and 
consists of recurring situations, routines, and activities. It is in these activities 
that a child starts responding to and performing attentional actions. The task 
that the child is faced with is becoming an active participant in the activities 
she engages in with her caregivers. Unsurprisingly, the first twenty words that 
a child produces typically pertain to salient aspects of recurrent situations that 
are highly relevant to the infant, such as people (daddy, mommy), games and 
routines (bye, night-night), animals (dog, kitty), and toys (book, balloon) 
(Fenson et al., 1994). Of these twenty first words, fourteen are concrete words.11
An interesting observation is made by Clark (2009, p. 88), who notes that 
when children start using language, they use a lot of deictic terms like that 
and general purpose verbs like do. As she points out, ‘without contextual 
details … it is usually impossible to interpret such utterances’, whereas, in 
‘context, with the aid of joint attention, it is normally quite clear what children 
are talking about when they do this.’ The crucial insight is that this line of 
reasoning holds for all of the child’s initial linguistic behaviour, and continues 
to hold, although to a lesser degree, even for fully competent adult linguistic 
11 The concrete words are daddy, mommy, dog, ball, baby, book, shoe, kitty, bird, eye, balloon, bottle, banana, 
and juice, the other words are bye, hi, uh oh, no, woof, and night night (Fenson et al. 1994, Table 15, p. 93).
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behaviour.12 This is because attentional actions function similar to ostensive 
pointing gestures: they are performed in a context in order to foreground 
a particular aspect of the situation, and without contextual details, they too 
are impossible to interpret. Quine’s question spells trouble only if we take 
the ostensive gesture as it is used in the education of attention as evidence 
for determining the reference. If we instead understand the attentional action 
to, as it were, take the place of the ostensive gesture, we do not have to answer 
Quine’s question. 
In other words, the attentional action inherits the referential ambiguity 
of the ostensive gesture by means of which the education of attention is 
initially achieved. This is possible because an attentional action is a species 
of ostensive gesture. As Baggs (2015, p. 260) puts it, speaking is ‘a technique 
for pointing’. The referential ambiguity only emerges from an observer-
perspective, once an observer asks himself what the reference of this word is. 
Learning to perform an attentional action does not require taking a stand on 
what a word refers to. Determining the extension of an attentional action (that 
which can be indicated by performing the attentional action) would be like 
determining the extension of the pointing gesture abstracted from the context 
in which the pointing gesture occurs: a pointless exercise. 
Crucially, the referential ambiguity usually does not show up from 
a participant’s perspective, that is, from the perspective of the child or 
the caregiver in the education of attention, and is not detrimental to 
communicational success. The reason is that the object of indication is 
individuated, not by decontextualised referential knowledge (of the form 
‘dog’ refers to dogs), but by the unfolding of the (recurrent) situation, in 
which only certain affordances are relevant, and thus can become more salient 
as a result of the attentional action.
At the same time, to highlight the situatedness and ostensive nature 
of indication by means of attentional actions is not to say that there is no 
potential for misunderstanding or conflict. It is crucial to note here that 
indicate is used as a ‘verb of success’ (Ryle, 1949/2009, p. 114). As mentioned, 
whether someone succeeds in indicating something to someone is not 
only dependent on her behaviour, but lies in the successful coordination of 
behaviour. In other words, ‘indication of a single object, place, or event, is 
an achievement of a dyad, not a given.’ (Reed, 1995, p. 11). In order to play 
her part in this achievement, a child needs to be able to successfully 
coordinate her behaviour with others by means of attentional actions. This 
12 For an extension to competent adult language use, we can remind ourselves of Ryle’s (1945b, p. 215) claim 
that all words incorporate a systematic ambiguity: ‘A given word will, in different sorts of context, express ideas 
of an indefinite range of differing logical types and, therefore, with different logical powers.’ The example he 
gives is that of punctual, which ‘can be used to characterize a person’s arrival at a place, the person who arrives 
there, his character and even the average character of a class of persons’. Comparing these different kinds of 
punctuality would be absurd, according to Ryle, and thus he concludes, ‘where precision is wanted, it is wrong 
to speak of “the idea” of punctuality’ (Ibid., 216). This conclusion is in line with our rejection of the code-view.
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means that the success conditions are not specified by the attentional 
action, but emerge in the unfolding of the situation and are to be decided upon 
by the interacting dyad. 
To summarise, on the constraint view, concrete words do not stand 
for anything. Learning to use these words does not consist in acquiring 
knowledge-that about their meaning. Instead, learning to talk is learning 
a repertoire of social skills. A child’s first utterances of concrete words are 
used to indicate aspects of the current situation to others in order to achieve 
something, and are therefore understood as attentional actions. An attentional 
action is like an ostensive gesture: it points out something. Learning takes 
place by means of the education of attention, where attentional actions are 
‘anchored’ to aspects of the environment. In order to understand better how 
this ‘anchoring’ functions, we now turn to empirical research into the effect 
of colour words on categorical colour perception.
2. The case of colour
Categorical colour perception has been the preferential paradigm for 
studying the influence of language on putatively non-linguistic processes, 
because it is a prime example of categorical perception that allows for easy 
cross-cultural comparison. In particular, research has focussed on category 
effects, which can broadly be understood as any effect of verbal categorisation 
on colour cognition; for example, an effect of verbal categorisation on speed 
or accuracy in discriminating or remembering colours. In this section, I report 
the category effects found in this research, in order to draw some implications 
for understanding utterances of concrete words as attentional actions in 
the next section.
2.1. Basic colour words and cultural differences
Research into categorical colour research relies on the notion of basic colour 
words. Colour words are basic when they are monolexemic, not subsumed 
under other colour words (such as navy), applicable to all objects (which 
excludes blonde for example), and psychologically salient for a community 
(Berlin & Kay, 1969). In English, these criteria are met by the words white, 
black, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey. Other 
languages, however, employ different colour words that categorise colour 
space in different ways.13 For example, the Dani from New Guinea employ just 
two basic colour words, mili and mola (Rosch-Heider & Olivier, 1972), and 
13 There is a debate whether the development of colour terms across linguistic communities is universal. Berlin 
and Kay (1969) for instance, argued that all linguistic communities go through the same seven stages, starting 
out by making a dark-cool/light-warm distinction, then adding red, and so forth until they finally make it to 
the universal end-point which is expressed in the eleven English basic colour words. There however, seem to 
be counter examples to this alleged universality (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000). Moreover, the alleged 
universal order is not found in language learning (Andrick & Tager-Flusberg, 1986; Pitchford & Mullen, 2002).
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the Berinmo have five basic colour words including nol which spans colours 
ranging from yellow to purple (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000).
2.2. Russian blues
To investigate category effects, Winawer et al. (2007) devised a speeded 
colour discrimination task that relies on the fact that Russian speakers have 
basic colour words for lighter blues (goluboy) and darker blues (siniy), where 
the English basic colour word blue spans these two categories. Participants 
were shown a triad of blue colour squares and had to indicate as quickly 
and as accurately as possible which of the bottom two squares was the same 
colour as the top square (see Figure 2). In so-called cross-category trials, 
the distractor square was across the siniy/goluboy category border, as 
determined for that each Russian speaker individually by means of 
an elicitation procedure, whereas in within-category trials the distractor 
square was in the same verbal category as the target square.  Of course, 
for English speakers all squares always belonged to the same basic verbal 
colour category, blue.  
The results of this speeded discrimination task were that Russian speakers’ 
performance showed a category effect: their reaction times were significantly 
shorter in cross-category trials than in within-category trials, an effect that was 
absent for English speakers. In other words, when the target and distractor 
square fall on different sides of the siniy-goluboy category boundary, Russian 
speakers are able to identify the target square faster than when both the target 
and and the distractor square fall in the same category. Interestingly, when asked 
to differentiate between light blue and dark blue, English participants drew 
almost the same border as Russians did between goluboy and siniy. This shows 
that English participants can visually distinguish light and dark blues in similar 
ways to Russian participants.
This experiment evaded the critique levelled against earlier research. For 
example, Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, and Shapiro (2005) asked participants 
to categorise a collection of colour swatches, and found that people tended 
to categorise the colour chips in accordance with verbal categories. They 
interpreted the results as showing a category effect: they claimed that it 
showed that to the participants, colours from the same verbal category looked 
Figure 2. Example of a cross-category trial in Winawer et al. (2007).
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more alike than colours from a different verbal category. However, this effect 
can also be explained in terms of a deliberate linguistic strategy: participants 
could simply put together those colours for which they use the same colour 
word (Pinker, 1994). In the experiment of Winawer et al. (2007), this 
strategy was not possible: the task did not involve subjective judgements 
of colour similarity, but consisted in finding the correct answer to a simple 
discrimination task. Moreover, the effect was measured in the reaction time 
of participants, a measure that is taken not to be under the participants’ control. 
Further evidence that category effects are not due to a deliberate linguistic 
strategy is given by Thierry et al. (2009). They devised an experiment that 
showed that the category boundary in Greek between basic colour words for 
light and dark blue has a category effect on implicit colour discrimination 
in a colour oddball detection task. In this experiment, participants were shown 
a sequence of stimuli differing in colour and shape and were instructed to 
press a button when they saw a particular shape. This means that changes in 
colour were irrelevant to the task. However, Thierry et al. were able to find 
a category effect using an electrophysiological measure: the Greek distinction 
between light and dark blues led to a larger visual mismatch negativity 
(‘an index of automatic and preattentive change detection’ Ibid., p. 4567) in 
the case of a deviant colour stimulus as compared to English participants 
for whom the deviant stimuli fell in the same verbal category (cf. 
Athanasopoulos et al., 2009).
The category effects just discussed could be explained in two different 
ways. First, the effect might be due to ‘warping’ of perceptual space on 
longer timescales. On this explanation, development in a culture with specific 
verbal colour categories leads to lasting effects on colour perception. Second, 
the effect might unfold on much shorter time-scales. On this explanation, 
linguistic processes have an online modulatory effect on cognitive processes. 
A way to decide between these two competing explanations is to compare 
the interference of verbal dual tasks and other cognitively demanding duals 
tasks on the category effects. If the category effects obtain due to warping 
of perceptual space on longer timescales, a verbal dual task should not lead 
to more interference when compared to a equally demanding non-verbal dual 
task. If, however, the effect is due to online modulation a verbal dual task 
should lead to interference over and above that of non-verbal dual tasks.
Earlier studies found that the category effects were indeed subject to verbal 
interference in this way. For example, Roberson and Davidoff (2000) found 
that the category effect that obtained in a two-alternative forced-choice 
recognition experiment14 could be eliminated if participants were asked to 
recognise the colour swatch they had just seen after reading aloud for five 
to ten seconds (cf. Pilling & Davies, 2004). This result only shows verbal 
14 This means that participants were shown a colour swatch, and after a delay of five or ten seconds were shown 
a target and distractor square, and had to indicate which of these was the same as the initial colour swatch.
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interference in the case of colour memory. Winawer et al. (2007) also found 
that their observed category effect was eliminated by a verbal-interference 
dual task (silent rehearsal of digit strings), but not by a spatial-interference 
dual task (memorising a spatial pattern). The elimination of the category 
effect is thus not due to some general cognitive load limitation. However, 
verbal interference does not eliminate all category effects (Pilling, Wiggett, 
Özgen, & Davies 2003), a finding that suggests that category effects also 
play out on longer timescales.
The linguistic origins of the category effects are further corroborated by 
findings showing that they are strongest in the right visual hemifield, which 
projects contralaterally to the putative language-dominant left hemisphere 
(Drivonikou et al., 2007; Franklin, Drivonikou, Bevis, et al., 2008; Franklin, 
Drivonikou, Clifford et al., 2008; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006; Regier & 
Kay, 2009; but see Suegami, Aminihajibashi, & Laeng, 2014).
2.3. Categorising and anomic aphasia
Further evidence of the transient effect of language on perception comes 
from studying individuals with anomic aphasia, that is, who have difficulty 
naming, among other things, colours. Here the influence of linguistic 
categories on putatively non-linguistic tasks is shown to be more dramatic: 
without an active command of colour words the task of colour categorisation 
is impossible (Davidoff & Luzzatti, 2005; Dummett, 1975). Davidoff and 
Roberson (2004) describe the problems that patient LEW has with sorting 
colour chips into categories. Instead of relying on categorical perception, he 
had to rely on discrimination:
if colour samples were presented for which the within-group similarity 
was much greater than the between-group similarity (i.e., narrow ranges 
of reds, greens, yellows, and blues), he sorted them into four groups 
without error. Nevertheless, his performance was abnormal because he 
used a slow pairwise comparison for each stimulus; the colour groups did 
not ‘pop-out’. His abject failure was for tasks where within-group colours 
had a wide range of lightness and saturation; in those situations, assessing 
visual similarity is extremely difficult. (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004, p. 139).
In the first task, the greater within-group similarity allowed LEW to arrive 
at the grouping using only the ability to perceptually discriminate between 
two colour samples when they were present at the same time. When the 
within group similarity was lower, LEW was presented with a problem that is 
unsolvable through discrimination abilities alone. This closely resembles 
the sorites paradox (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004): we can make a row of 
colour chips ranging from red to blue, and make sure that the difference in hue 
between all the chips is equal. By relying only on colour discrimination, there 
is no point discernible where the category boundary should be. And indeed, 
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when LEW was confronted with such a task, he drew the conclusion that 
all colour chips belonged to the same colour category. He arrived at this 
conclusion by looking for colour chips that appeared identical to him, and 
then moving them to a group, and then repeating this procedure until all 
the colour chips were in the same group.
2.4. Categorical perception beyond colour
Categorical colour perception is usually taken as a paradigm for studying 
the effects that verbal categories have on putatively non-verbal cognitive 
processes. However, if the category effects were only obtained in categorical 
colour perception, they would at best provide a cognitive curiosity. 
Fortunately, there is a growing literature which aims to extend the findings 
from the research on categorical colour perception to categorical perception in 
general (see Lupyan, 2012, for an overview). Gilbert, Regier, Kay, and Ivry 
(2008), for example, found that the the lateralisation of the category effect also 
occurs for the perception of animal figures (cats and dogs). This asymmetry 
between hemifields was, like the category effect in colour perception, subject 
to interference in the case of verbal dual task, but not a spatial dual task. 
A second example is the category effect that Boutonnet, Dering, 
Viñas-Guasch, and Thierry (2013) found using electrophysiological 
measures for the categorical distinction English speakers draw between 
cups and mugs, a distinction that Spanish speakers do not make. A final 
example is an experiment performed by Lupyan and Spivey (2010), where 
participants had to attend selectively to four fives presented together with four 
2s while fixating their gaze on the cross (see Figure 3). As soon as a small 
dot appears next to one of the 5s, the subjects have to press a button. 
The subjects were found to perform faster on trials where they heard 
a recorded voice saying ‘attend to the five’ as compared to trials where they 
heard a recorded voice saying ‘attend to the category’. As the task of 
attending to the 5s remained the same for a 45-minute period of time, 
hearing the word ‘five’ was completely redundant. This result seems to suggest 
that hearing the word ‘five’ directed the participants’ attention to the 5s.
Figure 3. Display used by Lupyan and Spivey (2010, based on their figure 1).
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3. Attentional actions as constraints on phenotypic reorganisation 
In this section, I combine the account of utterances of concrete words as 
attentional actions based on the constraint view with the empirical results 
discussed in the previous section. In line with the don’t-need strategy as 
discussed in §1.2, I provide an account that can potentially explain the effects 
suggested by the empirical research without invoking representations. 
The empirical results suggest that there are indeed category effects of 
verbal categories on colour perception. At the same time, the fragility of these 
category effects, as manifested in their being subject to verbal interference, 
suggests that these category effects are the result of a complex interplay of 
different timescales. The empirical evidence also shows that the category 
effects based in verbal categorisation are found in the absence of overt 
language use. A potential way of understanding the mechanism behind this is 
the ecological notion of a task-specific device (Bingham, 1988; Runeson, 
1977; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). The guiding idea is that for the purposes of 
a particular task, an organism self-organises into a task-specific device which 
is assembled of resources distributed over body, brain, and environment.15  
One way of understanding the assembly of task-specific devices is by 
means of phenotypic reorganisation. On this view, ‘people turn themselves 
into walkers, throwers, graspers, and so on, and in so doing, they perceive 
the world in relation to what they have become.’ (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013, p. 172). As can be seen in this quote, Proffitt and Linkenauger focus 
on basic sensorimotor interactions with the environment. Their claim is that 
visual ecological information for affordances16 is scaled based on morphology, 
physiology, and target-directed action. For example, whether something is 
graspable for a particular person depends, amongst other variables, on the size 
of their hand. Therefore, when a person is engaged in grasping something, 
the information for graspable is scaled based on hand size, among other 
things. In this way, the purposes of the organism, in the sense of the activities 
the organism is currently engaged in, ‘mandate a goal-directed phenotypic 
reorganization’ (Ibid., p. 180). Note that the ongoing phenotypic 
reorganisation is envisaged as a dynamic process of self-organisation.
For our present concerns, we can extend the notion of becoming 
a task-specific device by means of phenotypic reorganisation to categorical 
15 For a discussion of the role the brain may play in this process of self-organisation and how neuroscience 
might develop methods to study this, see Anderson (2014, pp. 272–280) and Van Elk, Slors, and Bekkering 
(2010). See Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld (2016) for an ecological-enactive interpretation of the free 
energy principle that similarly describes the self-organisation of the brain-organism-environment system.
16 Ecological information is information without content, that is non-semantic information, that enables an 
organism to pick up on affordances. The basic idea is that structures in ambient energy arrays are informative 
to an organism because they specify certain aspects of the environment. In other words, ecological information 
is information for affordances, not information about the world. Ecological information is not transmitted, nor 
is it processed or stored by a cognitive system (Gibson 1979). For a discussion see Van Dijk, Withagen, and 
Bongers (2015).
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colour perception by taking the social context into account. Information then 
is scaled based not on characteristics of the individual, such as hand size, 
or actions performed individually, but rather based on community level 
patterns of categorisation as inculcated through the education of attention and 
the (attentional) actions of others. As we noticed earlier, the normative 
structuring of the education of attention entails that the child need not already 
be able to perceive categorically in order to be taught to do so.17 What task 
a child is engaged in is determined initially by means of the normative and 
physical structuring of the learning situation by someone who has already 
mastered the relevant practice. If a caregiver introduces the child to colour 
words, she educates the child’s attention by structuring the learning situation. 
For example, by drawing the child’s attention to coloured objects, by showing 
the sorting of coloured objects, and so on. The caregiver also provides feedback 
on the child’s behaviour. In this process, the child attunes to the culturally 
determined colour categories. The use of colour words as attentional actions 
is crucial here, for they provide the caregiver with the means to ‘calibrate’ 
the child.  Hearing the word ‘red’ thereby comes to acts as a constraint on 
ongoing phenotypic reorganisation, making the child into a better red detector. 
Gibson (1966, p. 52) defined the education of attention as ‘a greater 
noticing of the critical differences with less noticing of irrelevancies’ and 
‘a progressive focussing or centering of the perceptual system’. The current 
account suggests that this progressive focussing needs to be understood in 
a dynamic way: as a person interacts with his or her environment, there is 
a continuous phenotypic self-reorganisation into task specific devices. 
This phenotypic reorganisation is constrained by the current situation, which 
in the human case often includes attentional actions. But on this account, 
attentional actions are not the only constraints that shape phenotypic 
reorganisation in culturally specific ways. The example of categorical colour 
perception suggests that attending to something that has a particular colour 
can act as a constraint on the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation. Attending 
to something red can have a similar constraining effect as hearing the colour 
word ‘red’, where both lead to phenotypic reorganisation as a red detector. 
In other words, and in line with the loopy nature of cognition, the ongoing 
phenotypic reorganisation is perceptually guided.
On the level of neural dynamics, the effect of verbal interference can be 
explained by adopting a neural reuse perspective. Anderson (2016, p. 1) 
defines neural reuse as a form of neuroplasticity that entails that a ‘diverse 
behavioral repertoire is achieved by means of the creation of multiple, 
nested, and overlapping neural coalitions, in which each neural element is 
17 This of course does not entail that the child requires no abilities whatsoever. For example, learning co-
lour words requires that the child is able to discriminate between different coloured objects. But colour 
discrimination does not necessarily rely on categorical colour perception, as the example of LEW discussed in 
§2.3 shows.
110ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
a member of multiple different coalitions and cooperates with a different set 
of partners at different times.’ A verbal interference task might rely on neural 
resources that would otherwise be used in the phenotypic reorganisation as 
a categorical colour perceiver. As Lupyan (2012, p. 4) remarks, once we 
have acquired categorical perception, much of our experience might best be 
described as ‘hybrid visuo-linguistic experience.’ 
The current account has no direct implications for phenomenal 
experience. One possibility is given by Anderson (2014, p. 271), who states 
that ‘Language probably does not make the world look different, but it can 
make some things easier to see’. Another possibility is that language does 
make the world look different, and thereby makes some things easier to see. 
For the purposes of this paper I will not explore the different ways of drawing 
the phenomenological implications of the current account. 
In line with the idea that organisms are always selectively open to a field 
of affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014), any organism self-organises 
into many different task specific devices at any given time. In line with the 
neural reuse perspective, we should be careful not to conceive of these task 
specific devices as neural modules, but rather as dynamically self-organising 
assemblies of resources distributed over body, brain, and environment. For 
example, a person is never only a grasper, although the anticipation of the act 
of grasping will lead to a shift in attention, which can be understood as 
a phenotypic reorganisation that enables an enhanced selective openness to 
those aspects of the environment that are relevant for grasping. The phenotypic 
reorganisation into task-specific devices is thus not an all or nothing affair. It is 
not the case that hearing the word ‘red’ either results in the phenotypic 
reorganisation into a red-detector, or fails to do so. Instead, we can think of 
attentional actions as transiently modulating phenotypic reorganisation. This 
modulation can then be up-regulated, for example by means of attentional 
actions, or down-regulated, for example by means of a verbal interference 
task (cf. Lupyan 2012).
This account of task specific devices, when combined with neural reuse, 
shows how perception can be constrained by processes at multiple time scales. 
The resulting picture is the following: by means of the education of attention, 
individuals learn to perceive categorically as expressed in structures in 
the dynamic unfolding of phenotypic reorganisation. This phenotypic 
reorganisation is perceptually guided and constrained by the actions of oneself 
as well of those of others. One example of these constraining actions are 
what I have called attentional actions. Although I have taken colour as a 
case study, the results for other forms of categorical perception discussed in 
the previous section suggests that this account might be applicable to 
categorical perception at large. For example, hearing the word ‘chair’ makes 
the person into a better ‘chair detector’ (Lupyan & Swingley, 2012). 
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4. Language beyond attentional actions
So far, I have argued that utterances of concrete words are best taken 
to be attentional actions (§1). I then discussed research on the effect 
of  community colour categories on individual colour cognition (§2), and 
proposed an ecological mechanism based on the idea that attentional actions 
function as constraints on the dynamic unfolding of phenotypic reorganisation 
(§3). In this final section, I situate the account of utterances of concrete words 
as attentional actions in a larger theoretical perspective on language by means 
of three remarks on (1) the context-dependency and reflexivity of language, 
(2) an extension of the current account to grammatically structured language, 
and (3) written language.
4.1. Context-dependency and reflexivity
It is important to stress that the current account highlights the 
context-dependency of linguistic actions. Attentional actions are not stored 
and retrieved, but produced to constrain processes that are unfolding now. 
In other words, we do not use language, understood as the tokening of 
culturally determined types, we make language in line with a history of 
learning (Harris, 1980). Although it is certainly the case that we can use words 
in many different contexts, this only shows our ability to recontextualise. 
And this ability to recontextualise does not entail a decontextualised meaning. 
To be able to walk on many different surfaces does not entail an ability to 
walk in abstracto; similarly, being able to use a word in different or novel 
contexts does not entail an ability to use that word in abstracto, that is, it does 
not require knowledge of a decontextualised ‘meaning’. This point is captured 
by Voloshinov (1930/1973, p. 68) when he says that ‘the task of understanding 
does not basically amount to recognizing the form used, but rather to 
understanding it in a particular, concrete context’ (cf. Davidson, 1986). 
Recognising the context-dependent nature of linguistic actions also does 
not negate the fact that we have normative practices that aim to regularise 
and standardise linguistic actions across contexts. As we have seen, 
the normative structuring of the initiate learning situation by the caregiver 
is critical for the child’s education of attention. Other paradigmatic examples 
include extensive institutionalised language education and the writing of 
dictionaries and grammar books and the prescriptive use made out of these 
codifications. These latter examples are an expression of the reflexivity of 
language, that is, our ability to talk about talking (Harris, 1998; Taylor, 1992, 
2000, 2010, 2013). I do not object to taking this reflexivity and the normative 
enforcing of linguistic behaviour it affords seriously. What I do object to is to 
take ‘products of these [reflexive] processes as realia, and to retroject them on 
to languagers as the basis for their languaging activities’ (Love, 2017, p. 1). 
To understand this, take for example the practice of promise making. This is 
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a reflexive practice because it consists in taking some linguistic act to be 
a promise. This is to say, if we were unable to say of some act that it was 
a promise, and we were unable to determine whether a promise was kept or 
broken, etc, we could not have the practice of promise making. At the same 
time, making promises does not have to be grounded in the existence of 
mental promises: the normative import of making a promise is not guaranteed 
by a mental state, but instead, by actually making the promise. Similarly, our 
practices that stabilise and normatively enforce the meanings of words do not 
have to be grounded in mental meanings. To reify promises or meanings is 
a prime example of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1929). 
In line with this focus on context-dependency, the constraining effect of 
attentional actions will also be context dependent. So, for example, 
the constraining effects of being asked the reflexive question how do you spell 
the word ‘green’ will be very different from a person telling you to look at 
that green one. For the purposes of this paper, I have only explored situations 
which are like the latter, in the sense that they involve what we might call, in 
line with the notion of indication in the definition of attentional actions, 
the indicative use of a concrete word. The question whether the reflexivity 
of language can be explained in terms of constraints I leave for a future occasion.
4.2. Grammatical structure and attentional actions
In my discussion on attentional actions, I have mainly considered a child’s 
single-word utterances of concrete words. This leaves open the question how 
we should make sense of concrete words as they are used in grammatically 
structured utterances. A tentative proposal is to see such utterances as enabling 
more fine-tuned attentional actions. As we have seen, attentional actions are 
performed by someone to indicate an aspect of the situation to someone else 
in order to achieve something. A child’s attentional action ball is used to 
indicate a ball in order, for instance, to request a ball that is already the focus 
of attention, to initiate a game that child and caregiver regularly play 
together, to inquire as to the whereabouts of a particular ball that the child 
lost, to mark the sudden unexpected appearance of a ball, and so forth. In this 
single word attentional action, only the object of indication is thus explicated.
The tentative proposal is that in structured attentional actions, concrete 
words still serve this indicative role. This means that the discussion on 
attentional actions as constraints on phenotypic reorganisation also applies 
to structured attentional actions. For example, an utterance of the form 
could you give me the ball is akin to a child’s single-word utterance ‘ball’ in 
the sense that it is an attentional action by means of which a ball is indicated 
in order to achieve something (in this case the other person handing me the 
ball). However, whereas only the structured environment reduces potential 
ambiguity in the case of the child’s single word attentional action, this 
potential ambiguity is reduced by linguistic means in the case of the structured 
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attentional action. If I’m asking another person Could you give me the ball, 
this is more constraining than if I simply say ball; but both are attentional 
actions that indicate the ball in order to achieve something. 
In terms of constraints, a structured attentional action is thus more 
constraining than a single-word  attentional action, but the same basic structure 
is preserved when the child makes the transition to structured attentional 
actions. That is, structured attentional actions still function akin to ostensive 
gestures.18 Of course, not all structured linguistic actions are attentional 
actions. However, providing criteria for delineating which structured linguistic 
actions are attentional actions and which are not falls outside the scope of 
this paper.
One might object that an extension to structured attentional actions fails 
the criterion of providing a don’t-need account, as linguistic structure requires 
mental representation. And indeed, the received view of the epistemology of 
language qua linguistic structure is that it requires an explicit representation of 
the rules that together can be said to constitute the grammar of a language.19 
However, non-representational alternatives have also been proposed. 
Christiansen and Chater (2015, p. 17), for example, suggest that linguistic 
structure can be understood in terms of a history of processing operations 
that constrain current processing. They use a metaphor also used by 
enactivists of ‘laying down a path in walking’ (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1991). 
According to this metaphor, we conceive of the unfolding of current processes 
as being constrained by the traces left by earlier processes. An example is 
a desire path: when a person walks on the grass, she leaves a visible trail that 
can guide the next person’s walking behaviour. By many people thus walking 
in each other’s footsteps, the path becomes more visible and thus constrains 
subsequent walking behaviour more strongly. Based on this history of 
processing account of linguistic structure, we can conceive of linguistic 
structure as providing further constraints. The resulting image is thus that 
when a child learns to employ structured utterances, her attentional actions 
become more strongly constraining. I realise that what I have said here 
with respect to linguistic structure is very brief, but it is merely intended 
to provide a direction in which the current account can be extended.
18 Kukla (2017) goes as far as saying that speech acts that make highly theoretical claims still have 
an ostensive dimension. She bases her account on Heidegger and Haugeland’s interpretation (2013, p. 67), 
who claims that in ‘making an assertion a speaker lets what is being talked about show itself from itself, 
by pointing it out—putting it on exhibit, so to speak. If, for instance, I discreetly mention that your shoelace 
is untied, I draw the shoelace to your attention so that you can see, “from” the shoelace itself, that it is un-
tied. By pointing out the untied shoelace (something I could also do without words), I let it be seen— let it 
show itself from itself.’
19 Matthews (2003, pp. 188–189) defines the ‘Received View’ of linguistic knowledge as follows: ‘knowing 
a language is a matter of knowing the system of rules and principles that is the grammar for that language. To 
have such knowledge is to have an explicit internal representation of these rules and principles.’ Devitt (2006), 
similarly, claims that ‘the received view’ is that ‘language processing involves metalinguistic representations of 
the syntactic and semantic properties of linguistic expressions’.
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4.3. Written language
The third remark situating the account of attentional actions concerns 
the extension to written language. First note that written language contributes 
considerably to the normative reflexive enforcing of linguistic behaviour. 
For example, without written language we could not write dictionaries, and 
we would thus be unable to ‘look up’ the meaning of a particular word (Ong, 
1982). Moreover, for us, hyper-literate human beings, our experience of 
spoken language is shaped profoundly by our facility with written language 
(Harvey, 2015). On the code view, a spoken utterance can encode the 
same mental meaning as a written sentence. The constraint view, however, 
highlights the fact that the production of spatio-temporal patterns in spoken 
or sign language and the production of spatial patterns in written language 
belong to different ontological categories, are used to do different things, and 
constitute different cognitive domains with different cognitive dynamics 
(Kravchenko, 2007, 2009; Linell, 2005; Love, 2007). Perhaps the most 
conspicuous difference is that for writing and reading the principle of 
co-temporality, as discussed in §1.5, does not hold. Understanding written 
concrete words from a constraint-view thus requires an additional account, 
that is outside the scope of the current paper.
5. Conclusion
I argued that on an ecological-enactive approach, utterances of concrete 
words are best seen as attentional actions that are used to indicate situations, 
events, objects, or characteristics thereof in order to coordinate behaviour. 
The results from empirical research show that the attention-directing effects 
of socially constituted categories affect cognitive processes in the absence 
of overt language use. This can be understood by relying on the idea that 
humans continuously self-organise into task specifics devices, a form of 
phenotypic reorganisation. The unfolding of this process is constrained by 
a history of learning, the actions of oneself, others, as well as aspects of 
the environment. In this way this paper proposed a novel explanation for 
the empirical phenomenon of category effects. Finally, I situated the account 
of concrete words as attentional action in a larger theoretical perspective 
on language. Although a small step, the account of spoken concrete words 
as attentional actions shows how the ecological-enactive approach to 
cognition can be extended to explain linguistic behaviour.
6. Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Daan Dronkers, Matthew Harvey, F.A. Muller, 
and Erik Myin, Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi, Merel Segers, the audience at 
The First International Conference about Language and Enaction, and the 
115 J. C. VAN DEN HERIK 
audience at the 13th Workshop of the OZSW Study Group Enactivism for 
comments and discussion. The constructive comments of two anonymous 
reviewers were also very helpful. Work on this paper was financially 
supported by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
7. References
Adolph, K. E., & Kretch, K. S. (2015). Gibson’s theory of perceptual learning. 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second 
Edition, 2015, 127–134. doi:10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.23096-1
Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Artificial 
Intelligence, 149(1), 91–130. doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7
Anderson, M. L. (2014). After phrenology: Neural reuse and the interactive 
brain. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Anderson, M. L. (2016). Précis of after phrenology: Neural reuse and the 
interactive brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–45. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X15000631
Andrick, G., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (1986). The acquisition of colour terms. 
Journal of Child Language, 13(1), 119–134. doi:10.1017/S030500090000 
0337
Athanasopoulos, P., Wiggett, A., Dering, B., Kuipers, J., & Thierry, G. (2009). 
The Whorfian mind. Electrophysiological evidence that language shapes 
perception. Journal Communicative & Integrative Biology, 2(4), 332–334. 
doi:10.4161/cib.2.4.8400
Aristotle (1975). Categories and De Interpretatione. J.L. Ackrill (Trans.). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baggs, E. (2015). A radical empiricist theory of speaking: Linguistic 
meaning without conventions. Ecological Psychology, 27(3), 251–264. 
doi:10.1080/10407413.2015.1068655
Bakhtin, M. M. (1982). The dialogical imagination (C. Emerson & M. 
Holquist, Trans.). University of Texas Press.
Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms: Their universality and 
evolution. California, CA: University of California Press.
Bingham, G. P. (1988) Task-specific devices and the perceptual bottleneck. 
Human Movement Science, 2(2–4), 225–264. doi:10.1016/0167-
9457(88)90013-9
Boutonnet, B., Dering, B., Viñas-Guasch, N., & Thierry, G. (2013). Seeing 
objects through the language glass. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
25(10), 1702–1710. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00415
Brooks, R. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 
139 – 159.
116ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
Bruineberg, J., & Rietveld, E. (2014). Self-organization, free energy 
minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances, Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 8(599), 1–14. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00599
Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2016). The anticipating brain is 
not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive 
perspective. Synthese, 1–28. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1
Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cairns, H. & Cairns, C. (1976) Psycholinguistics. New York, NY: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press.
Christiansen, M. H., & Chater, N. (2016). The now-or-never bottleneck: A 
fundamental constraint on language. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 
1–27. doi:10.1017/S0140525X1500031X
Clark, A. (1996). Linguistic anchors in the sea of thought? Pragmatics 
& Cognition, 4(1), 93–103. doi:10.1075/pc.4.1.09cla
Clark, A. (1997). Being there. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Clark, A., & Toribio, J. (1994). Doing without representing? Synthese, 101, 
401–431.
Clark, E. V. (1981). Acquisitional principles in lexical development. In: S.A. 
Gelman & J.P. Byrnes (Eds.), Perspectives on language and thought 
interrelations in development (pp. 31–71). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Clark, E. V. (2009). First language acquisition. Second edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Cowley, S. J. (2011a). Distributed language. In: Cowley, S. (Ed.), Distributed 
language (pp. 185–210). Amsterdam/Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
Cowley, S. J. (2011b). Taking a language stance. Ecological Psychology, 23, 
1–25. doi:10.1080/10407413.2011.591272
Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2015). From participatory 
sense-making to language: there and back again. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 14(4), 1089–1125. doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9
Cruse, D. A. (2017). The Lexicon. In: M. Aronoff & J. Rees-Miller (Eds.), The 
handbook of linguistics 2nd edition (pp. 235–254). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Davidoff, J., & Luzzatti, C. (2005). Language impairment and colour 
categories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(4), 494–495. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X05280081/
Davidoff, J., & Roberson, D. (2004) Preserved thematic and impaired 
taxonomic categorisation: A case study. Language and Cognitive 
Processes, 19(1), 137–174. doi:10.1080/01690960344000125
Davidson, D., 1986. A nice derangement of epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), 
Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson 
(pp. 433–446). Oxford: Blackwell.
117 J. C. VAN DEN HERIK 
Davis, H.G., Taylor, T. J. (Eds.). (1990). Redefining linguistics. London/New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Davis, H.G., Taylor, T. J. (Eds.). (2003). Rethinking linguistics. London/New 
York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon.
Degenaar, J., & Myin, E. (2014). Representation hunger reconsidered. Synthese, 
191, 3639–3648. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0484-4
Devitt, M. (2006). Ignorance of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
De Haan, S., Rietveld, E., Stokhof, M., & Denys, D. (2013) The 
phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients: An enactive affordance-based model. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 1–14. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013. 
00653
De Saussure, F. (2011). Cours de linguistique generale (W. Baskin, Trans.). New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work published in 1922).
Drivonikou, G. V., Kay, P., Regier, T., Ivry, R. B., Gilbert, A. L., Franklin, A., 
& Davies, I. R. L., (2007). Further evidence that Whorfian effects are 
stronger in the right visual field than the left. PNAS, 104(3), 1097–1102. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0610132104
Dummett, M. (1975). Wang’s paradox. Synthese, 3(4), 201–232. doi:10.1007/
BF00485048
Engel, K., Maye, A., Kurthen, M., & König, P. (2013). Where’s the action? 
The pragmatic turn in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
17(5), 202–209. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.03.006
Fenson, L., Dale, P. S., Reznick, S. J., Bates, E., Thal, D. J ., & Pethick, S. J. 
 (1994). Variability in early communicative development. Monographs of 
the Society for Research in Child Development, 59, (5, serial No. 242).
Fodor, J. A., (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Franklin, A., Drivonikou, G. V., Clifford, A., Kay, P., Regier, T., Davies, I. 
R. L. (2008). Lateralization of categorical perception of color changes 
with color term acquisition. PNAS, 105(47), 18221–18225. doi:10.1073/
pnas.0809952105
Franklin, A., Drivonikou, G. V., Bevis, L., Davies, I. R. L., Kay, P., Regier, 
T. (2008). Categorical perception of color is lateralized to the right 
hemisphere in infants, but to the left hemisphere in adults. PNAS, 105(9), 
3221–3225. doi:10.1073/pnas.0712286105
Gallagher, S. (2015). Seeing things in the right way: How social interaction 
shapes perception. In D. Maxime and Th. Breyer (Eds.), Normativity in 
perception (pp. 117–127). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
118ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
Gibson, E. J. (1953). Improvement in perceptual judgments as a function of 
controlled practice or training. Psychological Bulletin, 50, 401–431.
Gibson, E.J. (1963). Perceptual learning. Annual Review of Psychology, 14, 29–
59.
Gibson, E. J. & Rader, N. (1979). Attention – The perceiver as performer. In G. 
Hale (Ed.), Attention and cognitive development (pp. 1–21). New York, NY: 
Plenum Press.
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford 
(Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing: toward an ecological psychology 
(pp. 67–82). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin.
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., & Ivry, R. B. (2006). Whorf hypothesis 
is supported in the right visual field but not the left. PNAS, 103(2), 
489–494. doi:10.1073/pnas.0509868103
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., & Ivry, R. B. (2008). Support for 
lateralization of the Whorf effect beyond the realm of color discrimination. 
Brain and Language, 105(2), 91–98. doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2007.06.001
Harris, R. (1980). The language-makers. London: Duckworth.
Harris, R. (1990). On redefining linguistics. In H. Davis & T. J. Taylor (Eds.), 
Redefining Linguistics. London/New York, NY: Routledge.
Harris, R. (1998). Introduction to integrational linguistics. Pergamon, Oxford.
Harvey, M. I. (2015). Content in languaging: why radical enactivism is 
incompatible with representational theories of language. Language Sciences, 
48, 90–129.
Haugeland, J. (2013). Dasein disclosed. Cambridge, MA.: The Harvard 
University Press.
Hurley, S. (1998). Consciousness in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism. Basic minds without 
content. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. 
Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Ingold, T. (2001). From the transmission of representation to the education 
of attention. In: H. Whitehouse (Ed.), The debated mind: Evolutionary 
psychology versus ethnography (pp. 113–153). New York, NY: Berg.
Jackendoff, R. (1996). How language helps us thinks. Pragmatics & Cognition, 
4(1), 1-34. doi:10.1075/pc.4.1.03jac
Ježek, E. (2016). The lexicon: An introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
119 J. C. VAN DEN HERIK 
Kiverstein, J. & Clark, A. (2009) Introduction: Mind embodied, embedded, 
enacted: One church or many? Topoi, 28, 1–7. doi:10.1007/s11245-008-
9041-4
Kiverstein, J. & Rietveld, E. (2018). Reconceiving representation-hungry 
cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal. Adaptive Behavior, 1–17. 
doi:10.1177/105971231877277
Kravchenko, A. V. (2007). Essential properties of language, or, why language is 
not a code. Language Sciences, 29, 650–671. doi:10.1016/j.langsci. 
2007.01.004
Kravchenko, A. V. (2009). The experiental basis of speech and writing as different 
cognitive domains. Pragmatics & Cognition, 17(3), 527–548. doi:10.1075/
p&c.17.3.03kra
Kukla, R. (2017). Ostension and assertion. In: Z. Adams and J. Browning 
(Eds.) Giving a damn – Essays in dialogue with John Haugeland 
(pp. 103–130). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Linell, P. (2005). The written language bias in linguistics: Its nature, origins 
and transformations. London: Routledge.
Locke, J. (2004). An essay concerning human understanding. R. Woolhouse 
(Ed.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work published in 1690)
Love, N. (1990). The locus of languages in a redefined linguistics. In: H. G. 
Davis & T. J. Taylor (Eds.), Redefining Linguistics (pp. 53–118). London/
New York, NY: Routledge.
Love, N. (2004). Cognition and the language myth. Language Sciences, 26, 525–
544. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.003
Love, N. (2007). Are languages digital codes? Language Sciences, 29, 690–709. 
doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2007.01.008
Love, N. (2017). On languaging and languages. Language Sciences, 61, 1–35. 
doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2017.04.001
Lupyan, G. (2012). Linguistically modulated perception and cognition: the label-
feedback hypothesis. Frontiers in Psychology. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00054
Lupyan, G. (2016). The centrality of language in human cognition. Language 
Learning, 66(3), 516–553. doi:10.1111/lang.12155
LupyanG., & Spivey, M.J. (2010). Redundant spoken labels facilitate perception 
of multiple items. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72(8), 2236–
2253. doi:10.3758/BF03196698
Lupyan, G. & Swingley, D. (2012). Self-directed speech affects visual search 
performance. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(6), 
1068–1085. doi:10.1080/17470218.2011.647039
Markman, E.M. (1981). The whole-object, taxonomic, and mutual exclusivity 
assumptions as initial constraints on word meanings. In: S. A. Gelman 
& J. P. Byrnes (Eds.), Perspectives on language and thought Interrelations in 
development, 72–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
120ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
Maturana, H. R. (1978). Biology of language: The epistemology of reality. 
In: Miller, G. A. & Lenneberg, E. (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of 
Language and Thought. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Matthews, R., (2003). Does linguistic competence require knowledge of 
language? In: Barber, A. (Ed.), Epistemology of Language (pp. 187–213). 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 23(5-6), 80-104.
Noë, A. (2012). Varieties of presence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy. London/New York, NY: Routledge.
O’Regan, J. K. & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual 
consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 883–917. doi:10. 
1017/S0140525X01000115
Papafragou, A. (2005). Relations between language and thought: Individuation 
and the count/mass distinction. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.), Handbook 
of Categorization in Cognitive Science (pp. 256–272). Oxford: Elsevier.
Pilling, M., Wiggett, A., Özgen, E., & Davies, I.R.L. (2003). Is color “categorical 
perception” really perceptual? Memory & Cognition, 31(4), 538–551. 
doi:10.3758/BF03196095
Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct: How the mind creates language. New 
York, NY: William Morrow and Company.
Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought: Language as a window into human 
nature. London: Penguin.
Pitchford, N. J. & Mullen, K. T. (2002). Is the acquisition of basic-colour terms in 
young children constrained? Perception, 31, 1349–1370. doi:10.1068/p3405
Proffitt, D. R., & Linkenauger, S. A. ( 2013 ). Perception viewed as a phenotypic 
expression. In: W. Prinz, M. Beisert, & A. Herwig (Eds.), Action science: 
Foundations of an emerging discipline (pp. 171 – 197). Cambridge, MA : 
MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. (2009). Symbols as constraints: The structuring role of 
dynamics and self-organization in natural language. Pragmatics & Cognition, 
17(3), 653–676.
Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. (2011). Language as a system of replicable constraints. 
In H. Pattee (Ed.), Laws, language and life: Howard Pattee's classic papers 
on the physics of symbols (pp. 295–333). Dordrecht: Springer.
Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. (2016) How does a word become a message? An 
illustration on a developmental time-scale. New Ideas in Psychology, 42, 
46–55. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.08.001
Rączaszek-Leonardi, J., & Kelso, J. A. S. (2008). Reconciling symbolic and 
dynamic aspects of language: Toward a dynamic psycholinguistics. New 
Ideas in Psychology, 26(2), 193–207.
121 J. C. VAN DEN HERIK 
Rączaszek-Leonardi, J., Nomikou, I., & Rohlfing, K. J. (2013). Young 
children's dialogical actions: the beginnings of purposeful intersubjectivity. 
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, 5(3), 210–221. 
doi:10.1109/TAMD.2013.2273258.
Reddy, M. J. (1993). The conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our 
language about language. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought (2nd 
Edition) (pp. 164–201). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Reed, E. S. (1995). The ecological approach to language development: A radical 
solution to Chomsky's and Quine's problems. Language & Communication, 
15(1), 1–29. doi:10.1016/0271-5309(94)E0010-9
Reed, E. S. (1996). Encountering the world: Toward an ecological psychology 
(1st ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Regier, T. & Kay, P. (2009). Language, thought, and color: Whorf was half 
right. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13(10), 439–446. doi:10.1016/j.tics. 
2009.07.001
Rietveld, E. & Kiverstein, J. (2014). A rich landscape of affordances. 
Ecological Psychology, 26(4), 325–352. doi:10.1080/10407413.2014. 
958035
Roberson, D. & Davidoff, J. (2000). The categorical perception of colors and 
facial expressions- the effect of verbal interference. Memory & Cognition, 
28(6), 977–986. doi:10.3758/BF03209345
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R. L., & Shapiro, L. R. (2005). The 
development of color categories in two languages: A longitudinal 
study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(4), 554–571. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.4.554
Roberson, D., Davies, I. R. L., & Davidoff, J., (2000). Color categories are not 
universal: Replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(3), 369–398. doi:10.1037//10 
096-3445.129.3.369
Rosch Heider, E., & Olivier, D. C. (1972). The structure of the color space in 
naming and memory for two languages. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 337–354.
Runeson, S. (1977).On the possibility of “smart” perceptual mechanisms. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 18, 172–179.
Ryle, G. (1945a). Knowing how and knowing that. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series, 46, 1–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544405
Ryle, G. (1945b) Philosophical arguments. In G. Ryle (2009) Collected Essays 
1929-1968, 203-221. New York, NY: Routledge.
Ryle, G. (2009). The concept of mind 60th anniversary edition. J. Tanney (Ed.). 
London/New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published in 1949)
Stewart, J. (2010). Foundational issues in enaction as a paradigm for cognitive 
science: From the origin of life to consciousness and writing. In J. Stewart, 
O. Gapenne, & E. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for 
Cognitive Science (pp. 1–32). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
122ATTENTIONAL ACTIONS
Suegami, T., Aminihajibashi, S., & Laeng, B. (2014). Another look at category 
effects on colour perception and lateralisation. Cognitive Processing, 15(2), 
217–226. doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0595-8
Tanney, J. (2015) Gilbert Ryle. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(Spring 2015 Edition), E. N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2015/entries/ryle/>.
Taylor, T. J. (1990). Normativity and linguistic form. In H. G. Davis & T. J. 
Taylor (Eds.), Redefining Linguistics (pp. 118–148). London/New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Taylor, T. J. (1992). Mutual misunderstanding: Scepticism and the theorizing of 
language and interpretation. Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press/
Routledge.
Taylor, T. J. (2000). Language constructing language: the implications of 
reflexivity for linguistic theory. Language Sciences, 22, 483–499. 
doi:10.1016/S0388-0001(00)00016-4
Taylor, T. J. (2010). Where does language come from? The role of reflexive 
enculturation in language development. Language Sciences, 32, 14–27. 
doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2008.12.014
Taylor, T. J. (2013). Calibrating the child for language: Meredith Williams on 
a Wittgensteinian approach to language socialization. Language Sciences, 
40, 308–320. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2013.07.002
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development 
of cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thierry, G., Athanasopoulos, P., Wigget, A., Dering, B., & Kuipers, J. (2009). 
Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on preattentive color 
perception. PNAS, 106(11), 4567–4570. doi:10.1073/pnas.0811155106
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R., Reed, E., & Mace, W. (1981). Ecological laws of 
perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition, 9, 237–
304. 
Van den Herik, J. C. (2017). Linguistic know-how and the orders of language. 
Language Sciences, 61, 17–27. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2016.09.009
Van Dijk, L., Withagen, R., & Bongers, R. M. (2015). Information without 
content: A Gibsonian reply to enactivists’ worries. Cognition, 134, 210–214. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.012
Van Elk, M., Slors, M., & Bekkering, H. (2010). Embodied language 
comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 1(234), 1–9. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234
Van Gelder, T. (1998). The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 615–628.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., Rosch, E., (1991). The embodied mind: cognitive 
science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
123 J. C. VAN DEN HERIK 
Verbrugge, R. R. (1985). Language and event perception: steps toward a 
synthesis. In W. H. Warren, & R. E. Shaw (Eds.), Persistence and change. 
Proceedings of the first international conference on event perception (pp. 
157–194). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.
Voloshinov, V.N. (1930/1973). Marxism and the philosophy of language 
(L. Matejka & I. R. Titunik, Trans.). New York, NZ/London: Seminar Press.
Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality. New York, NZ: Harper.
Wilson, A. D., & Golonka, S. (2013). Embodied cognition is not what you think 
it is. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1–13. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00058
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 9(4), 625–636. doi:10.3758/BF03196322
Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, 
L. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. 
PNAS, 104(19), 7780–7785. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701644104
Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). Philosophical investigations (Revised 4th ed.). 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Zhu, Q., & Bingham, G. P. (2010). Learning to perceive the affordance for 
long-distance throwing: smart mechanism or function learning? Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(4), 
862–875. doi:10.1037/a0018738
Zukow-Goldring, P. & Ferko, K. R. (1994). An ecological approach to the 
emergence of the lexicon: Socializing attention. In V. John-Steiner, C. 
Panofsky, & L. Smith (Eds.), Sociocultural approaches to language and 
literacy: an interactionist perspective (pp. 170–194). Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
